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The recent breakup of socialist regimes in Eastern Europe and the troublesome 
process of transformation of former centrally planned economies into market 
economies has added a new aspect of  interest to the debate on catch-up and 
convergence. It raises such questions as, What were the main bottlenecks char- 
acterizing the slowdown in growth performance in the centrally planned econ- 
omies (CPEs) relative to the advanced market economies during the 1980s, 
and how have the basic parameters changed since transition began?' 
In earlier papers, the present authors and others dealt with the comparative 
productivity performance of manufacturing in a wide range of  countries, in- 
cluding centrally planned economies. Table 12.1 summarizes estimates of lev- 
els of  manufacturing productivity for twenty-three countries relative to the 
United States for the period 1970-94  derived from the International Compari- 
sons of Output and Productivity (ICOP) project. These estimates are based on 
the industry-of-origin method, which is briefly explained in section 12.1. 
Bart van Ark and Erik Monnikhof are affiliated with the Groningen Growth and Development 
Centre, University of Groningen, The Netherlands. When this paper was written, Marcel Timer 
was affiliated with the Department of Technology and Development Studies at the University of 
Eindhoven, The Netherlands. 
The authors are grateful to Remco Kouwenhoven, Adam Szirmai, and Ren Ruoen for making 
available their detailed product match information for the Soviet UnionlLTnited States (Kouwen- 
hoven 1996) and ChinaAJnited States (Szirmai and Ruoen 1995). The authors thank Irwin Collier, 
Steve Dowrick, Robert Lipsey, Nick van der Lijn, and D. S. Prasada Rao for their comments on 
an earlier version. They also thank Elsbeth Hardon for statistical assistance. They acknowledge 
Labour Cost Research Associates (LCRA) for their financial support in developing some of the 
recent binary comparisons for 1992 and 1993. The latter estimates have not been published but 
are available from the authors on request. 
1. In this paper, we will use the terms transition economies and centrally planned economies 
interchangeably. Both terms, as well as the term historically planned  economies used by Marer 
(1991). do not adequately characterize the present or even the historical situation of the countries 
in this group for the purpose of this paper. For the sake of simplicity, we mostly stick to the term- 
inology centrally planned economies. 
327 Table 12.1  ICOP Estimates of Comparative Levels of Labor Productivity in Manufacturing, 1970-94, United States = 100 
1970  1980  1987  1994 
Value Added  Value Added  Value Added  Value Added 
per Person  Value Added  per Person  Value Added  per Person  Value Added  per Person  Value Added 
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60.7  67.6 
49.9 
58.0  59.3  70.2 
74.3 Sweden  73.8  83.5  72.8  94.4  68.4  87.4  77.9  96.1 
West Germany  79.7  78.6  87.1  95.1  70.2  82.2  66.1  85.3 
France  73.0  73.3  83.0  89.8  71.2  84.0  72.9  89.3 
Japan  53.5  44.5  77.0  66.2  76.4  67.5  73.4  72.4 
Canada  86.3  86.5  86.8  89.0  77.3  80.8  71.6  75.2 
Netherlands  15.4  81.1  90.3  107.5  83.3  105.4  78.7  103.2 
United States  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Sources; Benchmark estimates: ChinaAJnited States (1987) from Szirmai and Ruoen (1995); Indiamnited States (1975) from van Ark (1991); Indonesiamnited 
States (1987) from Szirmai (1994); Taiwanmnited States from Timmer (1996); HungaryNest Germany (1987) from Monnikhof (1996); Polandmest Germany 
(1989) from Liberda, Monnikhof, and van Ark (1996); East Germanymest Germany (1987) from Beintema and van Ark (1994) with revisions (see van Ark  1995a); 
Polandmest Germany (1993) are unpublished ICOPLCRA estimates (January 1996); East Germanymest Germany (1992) are unpublished ICOPLCRA estimates 
(January  1996); Czechoslovakiamest Germany from van Ark and Beintema (1993) with revisions (see van Ark  1996); Soviet Unionmnited States (1987) from 
Kouwenhoven (1996); PortugaVUnited Kingdom (1984) from Peres Lopes (1994) linked to United Kingdommnited States (1987) from van Ark (1992); Korea/ 
United States (1987) and Japanmnited States (1987) from Pilat (1994); BraziVUnited States (1975) and Mexicomnited States (1975) from van Ark and Maddison 
(1994); SpainlUnited Kingdom (1984) from van Ark (1995b) linked to United Kingdommnited States (1987) from van Ark (1992); Australiamnited States (1987) 
from Pilat, Rao, and Shepherd (1993); United Kingdommnited States (1987) from van Ark (1992); Finlandmnited States (1987) and SwedenlUnited States (1987) 
from Maliranta (1994); West Germanymnited States (1987) from van Ark and Pilat (1993); FranceAJnited States (1987) from van Ark and Kouwenhoven (1994); 
Canadamnited States (1987) from de Jong (1996); Netherlandsmnited States from Kouwenhoven (1993). Extrapolations from benchmark years are mostly from 
(modified) national accounts series on real GDP and employment in manufacturing; see original publications above with extensions according to the ICOP industry 
database (University of Groningen). 
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Table 12.1 shows that, in 1987, the level of manufacturing labor productivity 
was lowest in China, whereas other CPEs show productivity levels in a range 
between those of typical low-productivity economies such as India and Indo- 
nesia and higher-productivity economies such as Korea, Brazil, and Mexico.2 
Compared to studies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union for earlier years, 
our estimates for the CPEs are relatively  This is related partly to a genuine 
decline in comparative productivity performance of the CPEs since the 1970s 
and partly to differences in methodology between this study and the earlier 
ones. Our estimates are based on value added rather than gross output, and we 
use industry purchasing power parities (PPPs), which are a geometric average 
of PPPs at market economy and CPE weights (see sec. 12.1). 
The explanation of productivity differences between countries has been ad- 
dressed from various angles. In earlier papers, we applied a “level accounting” 
approach, which accounted for the role of typical supply-side factors, such as 
differences in physical and human capital intensity, industry composition, and 
firm size (van Ark and Pilat 1993; van Ark 1993; Pilat 1994). Van Ark (1996) 
suggests that the emphasis on “extensive growth” strategies, based on rapid 
accumulation of  factor inputs without  substantive total  factor productivity 
(TFP) growth, explains much of the relative decline in the productivity perfor- 
mance of the CPEs, in particular during the 1970s and 1980s. 
Another plausible explanation for the relatively low productivity levels in 
CPEs is the misallocation of resources and final output because of a distorted 
relation between prices and quantities. The CPEs were characterized by a sys- 
tem of administrative prices that do not reflect scarcities in the market but are 
primarily based on cost plus net indirect taxes and a markup. This explanation 
for the bad performance of centrally planned economies has been put forward 
in many studies by key scholars in this field, including Bergson (1961, 1978, 
1987) and Kornai (1980,1992). 
In this paper, our aim is not to explain the productivity performance of the 
CPEs in the first place. In relation to the latter type of  explanation, we will 
investigate to what extent our estimates of price relatives and quantity relatives 
suggest a greater distortion in CPEs than in other countries. Second, we investi- 
gate regularities and irregularities in terms of price and quantity structures for 
groups of countries given their relative productivity levels. 
In section 12.1, we present our estimates of manufacturing output and pro- 
ductivity for four East European countries. Binary comparisons were made for 
East Germany and Hungary compared to West Germany for 1987 and Czecho- 
slovakia and Poland compared to West Germany for 1989. For two of  these 
countries (i.e., the East German Liinder and Poland), more recent benchmark 
comparisons for 1992/1993  were made as well. We also briefly outline the major 
2. Taiwan’s labor productivity in manufacturing was still somewhat below that of the CPE coun- 
3. For details on earlier studies, see n. 13 below. 
tries in 1987, but, as table 12.1 shows, it increased very substantially between 1987 and 1993. 331  Prices, Quantities, and Productivity in Industry 
characteristics of the industry-of-origin  approach as compared to the expendi- 
ture approach in international comparisons, and we deal extensively with the 
specific methodological problems that arise from the inclusion of  centrally 
planned economies in those studies. 
In the second half of the paper, we focus on the relative price and quantity 
structures between CPEs and non-CPEs and on the relation between price and 
quantity relatives. As our comparisons are all of a binary nature, we begin in 
section 12.2 by  analyzing the difference in purchasing power parities (in our 
terminology, unit vaEue  ratios [UVRs]) at quantity weights of the “own” coun- 
try (the Paasche UVR) with those at quantity weights of the “numeraire” (or 
base) country (the Laspeyres UVR). We  find that the Paasche-Laspeyres (PL) 
ratio, which provides an indication of  the “Gerschenkron effect,” is much 
higher for the CPEs than might be expected given their relative level of  labor 
productivity. Subsequently,  we analyze the issue from a mathematical perspec- 
tive, by  making use of the “Bortkiewicz formula” (Bortkiewicz 1922, 1924). 
According to this formula, the PL ratio is decomposed into three components: 
(1) the variance of price relatives; (2) the variance of quantity relatives; and 
(3) the correlation between price and quantity relatives. The relation between 
price and quantity relatives, which can be interpreted as a measure of  distor- 
tion, is analyzed, and various measures of the (dis)similarity  of price and quan- 
tity structures  between the countries are discussed. Subsequently,  each of these 
three components will be looked at in more detail and will be related to the 
relative labor productivity level in manufacturing. 
12.1  Manufacturing Productivity Levels in Centrally 
Planned Economies 
12.1.1  The Industry-of-Origin  Method Compared to the 
Expenditure Method 
International comparisons of GDP and per capita income are mostly made 
by converting national income into a common currency on the basis of expen- 
diture-based purchasing power parities (PPPs). These PPPs are obtained by 
expenditure category (private consumption, investment, and government ex- 
pendit~re).~  There is a long tradition of  such comparisons, also for centrally 
planned economies, including several studies by the UN Economic Commis- 
sion for Europe (see, e.g., ECE 1988, 1994).5 
Comparisons of productivity should preferably be based on the industry-of- 
4. For early postwar comparisons,  see, e.g., Gilbert and Kravis (1954) and Gilbert et al. (1958). 
Since the late 1960s, surveys were conducted at regular intervals by the International  Comparisons 
Project (ICP); see, e.g.,  Kravis, Heston, and Summers (1982) and the subsequent Penn World 
Tables (e.g., Summers and Heston 1988, 1991), which were derived from the ICP estimates. 
5. For a review of  ICP studies including CPEs, see Marer (1985). For a review of historical 
comparisons  of the Soviet Union and the United States, see Kudrov (1995). 332  Bart van Ark, Erik Monnikhof, and Marcel Timmer 
origin approach. It involves comparisons of real output by  sector of the econ- 
omy (agriculture, industry, and services) and branches and industries within 
these sectors. The earliest industry-of-origin studies were mainly based on di- 
rect comparisons of physical quantities produced (tons, liters, units) (see, e.g., 
Rostas 1948).6  Later on, industry comparisons switched to using “industry” 
purchasing power parities to convert the output value by industry, branch, or 
sector to a common currency.’ 
Since 1983, a substantial research effort has been made at the University of 
Groningen to develop the industry-of-origin approach as part of the Intema- 
tional Comparisons of Output and Productivity (ICOP) project. So far, most 
ICOP studies dealt with comparisons of  manufacturing productivity, which 
now include almost thirty countries, most of which are reported in table 12.1.8 
The most solid basis for industry-of-origin studies is provided when, for 
each country, all information can be derived from a single primary source, 
which, in the case of manufacturing, is the census of production or industrial 
survey. It contains considerable detail on the output and input structure by in- 
dustry and information on the sales values and quantities of  most products. 
The “industry” PPPs are based on ratios of unit values (derived from the sales 
values and quantities reported) for matched products between two countries. 
This method is fundamentally different from the pricing technique in the ICP 
expenditure approach, which makes use of prices for specified products. The 
industry-of-origin technique provides unit values with a quantity counterpart, 
as quantities times “prices” equals the value equivalent. 
As the production censuses and industry surveys are harmonized across 
countries only to a limited extent, the most practical approach is to make the 
industry-of-origin comparisons on a two-country basis. For ICOP compari- 
sons, the United States or West Germany is mostly taken as the “numeraire” 
(or base) c~untry.~ 
Unit value ratios cannot be obtained for all output produced, mainly because 
of differences in product mix and product quality across countries, the lack of 
information for reasons of confidentiality, and the existence of unique products 
in one of two countries compared. In practice, between 67 (in the case of the 
China/United States comparison for 1987) and 414 (in the case of  the Ger- 
manymnited States comparison for 1992) unit value ratios are obtained, which 
cover between 10 and 50 percent of  the total value of  manufacturing sales 
(see table 12.5 below). Coverage percentages are usually somewhat below the 
average for typical investment goods (such as machinery and transport equip- 
6. For a Soviet UnionKJnited States comparison of this nature, see Galenson (1955). 
7. For an early comparison of this nature for the United Kingdom and the United States in 1950, 
see, e.g., Paige and Bombach (1959). For comparisons including  Austria, Czechoslovakia, France, 
and Hungary for the 1960s. see Conference of European Statisticians  (1971, 1972). 
8. For an overall review of ICOP studies, see Maddison and van Ark (1994).  For manufacturing, 
seevanArk (1993). 
9. For an application of multilateral indexes to original binary ICOP comparisons at aggregate 
levels of  industries and branches, see Pilat and Prasada Rao (1996). 333  Prices, Quantities, and Productivity in Industry 
ment)  and above average in nondurable consumer goods (such as food and 
kindred products). By reweighting UVRs at various stages from the product 
level up to the industry, branch, and sector level, using either quantities (at the 
product level) or value added (at higher levels) as weights, it is assured that the 
UVRs of products in bigger industries affect the UVR for total manufacturing 
more strongly than those of smaller industries. At the same time, the sensitivity 
of the aggregate UVR to outlier UVRs is reduced in this way. 
Despite their shortcomings (which can be reduced by using more detailed 
product information or by adjusting existing UVRs for observed quality differ- 
ences),1° ICOP UVRs are preferred over ICP PPPs as a conversion factor for 
sectoral studies. First, expenditure-based PPPs include prices of imports but 
not of exports. Second, the expenditure prices include trade and transport mar- 
gins, which may differ between countries. Finally, expenditure PPPs exclude 
price ratios for intermediate products, which form a substantial part of manu- 
facturing output." 
12.1.2  Comparisons of Prices and Productivity for East 
European Countries12 
Studies of comparative output and productivity levels for centrally planned 
economies raise specific problems that  are less  important  for comparisons 
among market economies. 
1. Centrally planned economies have less meaningful prices on the basis of 
which output is compared to that of market economies. Official price quota- 
tions are mostly administered prices, which are determined differently from 
the price-formation process in a market economy. Comparisons between CPEs 
and market economies have therefore often been made on the basis of pricing 
the products at Western prices only, for example, at U.S. dollars or West Ger- 
man marks.I3 Such comparisons usually imply that the output of the country 
10. See, e.g.,  Gersbach and van Ark (1994) for a detailed description of adjustments to ICOP 
PPPs used in a comparative study of manufacturing productivity between Germany, Japan, and the 
United States, by the McKinsey Global Institute (1993). 
11. For recent applications of expenditure PPPs to industry-of-origin comparisons, see Hooper 
and Vrankovich (1995) and Pilat (1996). 
12. This section concentrates on the main problems of comparisons including former CPEs. For 
a more detailed account of methods and procedures for each binary comparison and more detailed 
estimates, see van Ark and Beintema (1993). For the comparison of  Czechoslovakia and West 
Germany, see van Ark (1996). For East Germany vis-a-vis West Germany in 1987, see Beintema 
and van Ark (1994) and van Ark (1995a). For Poland and West Germany in 1989, see Liberda, 
Monnikhof, and van Ark (1996). For Hungary vs. West Germany, see Monnikhof (1996). Details 
of comparisons for East and West Germany in 1992 and Poland and West Germany in 1993 have 
not yet been published. The Soviet UnionNnited States and ChinaNnited States comparisons are 
not dealt with in this section. For this, the reader is referred to Kouwenhoven (1996) and Szirmai 
and Ruoen (1995). 
13.  Van Ark (1995a) extensively describes earlier comparisons of East and West German output, 
which include Sturm (1974), Wilkens (1970), and Gorzig and Gornig (1991). There has also been 
one study comparing Czechoslovakia and France in the framework of a four-country comparison 
(Austria, Czechoslovakia, France, and Hungary) at the end of the 1960s (Conference of European 
Statisticians  1971, 1972). All these studies make use, to a considerable extent at  least, of  the 334  Bart van Ark, Erik Monnikhof, and Marcel Timmer 
for which the prices are substituted by  the prices of  the other country gets 
overstated. This stylized fact, which may be referred to as the Gerschenkron 
effect, will be discussed in more detail in section 12.2. 
Although the unit values of the CPEs represent administered prices, these 
remain the most practical for calculating unit value ratios because of the iden- 
tity of quantities times prices and values in our data set: the CPE output value 
that needs to be converted to West  German marks is expressed in the same 
administered prices as the unit values in the unit value ratios.14 Table  12.2 
shows the average unit value ratio for manufacturing for the benchmark years 
of our comparisons for four East European countries. The table shows that, in 
all cases, the UVRs are substantially below the commercial exchange rate. The 
commercial exchange rates reflect the relatively high price of exported goods, 
when expressed in domestic currencies, compared to the amount of West Ger- 
man marks these goods earn on the world market. The exchange rate deviation 
index is therefore substantially above one in all cases. 
2. There are significant differences between the quality of  products pro- 
duced in CPEs and that of those produced in market economies. Although one 
can safely assume that, on the whole, average product quality was lower in 
CPEs than in market economies, it is not clearly documented whether such 
differences were equally large across the whole range of manufacturing prod- 
ucts. Furthermore, given the administrative nature of the pricing system in the 
CPEs, one cannot be sure to what extent quality differences were or were not 
reflected in the actual prices. 
The present comparisons for Czechoslovakia (1989), East Germany (1987), 
and Poland (1989) include a rough quality adjustment for passenger cars. This 
adjustment was derived from a price valuation of a Czech-made car (a Skoda) 
in West Germany compared to the average price of a car of West German make 
in 1989. The overall effect of the quality adjustment for cars on the unit value 
ratio for manufacturing as a whole was  16 percent for the Czechoslovakia/ 
West Germany comparison, 11 percent for the East Germanymest Germany 
comparison in 1987, and 8 percent for the PolanWest Germany comparison 
in 1989.15 
3. A third problem that affects output and productivity comparisons between 
method by which quantities were valued at Western prices only. Most comparisons between former 
CPEs were carried out by the CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) Standing Statisti- 
cal Commission. These estimates were based  on detailed repricing of  individual commodities 
mostly with the former Soviet Union as the numeraire country. Until the dissolution of the CMEA, 
these estimates were not disclosed, although recently estimates for 1988  were published by Come- 
con (1990). For a detailed description of earlier estimates for these countries, see Drechsler and 
Kux (1972). Kouwenhoven (1996) and Kudrov (1995) provide a review of former Soviet Union/ 
United States estimates. 
14. Here, we ignore the distorting effect that administrative prices may have on the weighting 
system, which may affect the interpretation of the aggregate results (see, e.g., Marer 1985). 
15. For further details, see van Ark (1995a, 1996)  and Liberda, Monnikhof, and van Ark  (1996). 
These sources also show the results without the quality adjustment. For the Hungarymest Ger- 
many comparison, no adjustment for quality was made as there were no cars produced in Hungary. Table 12.2  Unit Value Ratios for Total Manufacturing and Commercial Exchange Rates for (former) CPEs, 1987-93 
Unit Value Ratio (own currencylDM) 
Commercial  Exchange Rate 
At Own Country  At West German  Geometric  Exchange Rate  Deviation Index 
Quantity Weights  Quantity Weights  Average  (own currencylDM)  (4143) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
CzechoslovakiaWest Germany (1989)  3.72  4.03  3.87  8.01 
East GermanyWest Germany (1987)  1.81  1.98  1.89  4.52 
HungaryWest Germany (1987)  12.5  15.3  13.8  25.8 
PolandWest Germany (1989)  343.1  342.8  343.0  1,439.2 
East GermanyWest Germany (1992)  .77  .73  .75 
Poland/All Germany (1993)  5,313.4  5,221.9  5,267.5 









Source: See table 12.1 and appendix table 12A.1. Exchange rates from World Bank (1993). 
Nore: For details on the matching procedure, see appendix table 12A.1. 336  Bart van Ark, Erik Monnikhof, and Marcel Timmer 
CPEs and market economies concerns differences in industry classification 
schemes. For the CPEs, there are difficulties in separating activities in mining 
and utilities from those in manufacturing. More important is that employment 
estimates for manufacturing in CPEs often include employees from a wide 
range of secondary activities, such as repair and maintenance and social ser- 
vices provided by  firms on a much wider scale than in market economies. 
Where possible, adjustments to Western classification schemes were made. 
Similarly, as far as possible, labor input in social services etc. was excluded 
from the employment data. 
4. Finally, differences in the concept of  output between CPEs and market 
economies have been a matter of  major concern in comparative economics. 
Comparisons across countries can be made either on the basis of gross output 
or on the basis of value added. The difference between these two output mea- 
sures is the intermediate inputs. According to the traditional material product 
system (MPS) accounting system used by the CPEs, output concerns only ma- 
terial production, and intermediate inputs concern only material inputs (raw 
materials, energy, packaging) and some industrial services (e.g., contract la- 
bor). Nonindustrial service inputs were not measured. 
As we did not have detailed information on nonindustrial services for the 
CPE countries, our output comparisons are in terms of gross output and value 
added, where, in the latter case, we only deducted material cost from gross 
output (see appendix table 12A.2).I6  Table 12.3 shows the comparative levels 
of gross output, value added, and gross output and value added per employee 
that were obtained with the help of the unit value ratios from table 12.2.17  The 
estimates show that the output gap between the CPEs and West Germany was 
smaller in terms of gross output than in terms of value added, which suggests 
a greater use of  intermediate inputs in the CPE countries. This can also be 
derived from the final column of table 12.3, which shows the ratio of material 
inputs to gross output in domestic prices. In all cases but one, this ratio was 
substantially larger in the CPEs (between 60 and 65 percent of gross output) 
than in West Germany (between 48 and 53 percent).18 
16. For the 1992/1993 comparisons, we stayed as much as possible with the same concepts as 
for the late 1980s, partly to retain comparability and partly because, in the case of Poland, the 
statistics of the early 1990s have not yet been fully adjusted to Western concepts of output and em- 
ployment. 
17. With the exception of Poland (1989), the same unit value ratios were used for the compari- 
sons of value added and gross output, assuming that the price ratios for gross output were also 
representative for the intermediate inputs. Although this assumption (which can be contrasted with 
double deflation when intermediate inputs are converted with an independent UVR for intermedi- 
ate inputs) could not be cross-checked with other evidence, there is no immediate reason to expect 
a systematic difference between UVRs at the gross output level and UVRs for intermediate inputs. 
Only in the case of Poland (1989) did we develop separate UVRs for intermediate inputs, which 
were obtained by backdating the gross output UVRs with six months (assuming that this was the 
average time during which intermediate inputs were kept in stock), using the producer price index 
for Poland. (See Liberda, Monnikhof, and van Ark 1996.) 
18. The Polish case for 1989 was exceptional. Because of the high inflation during the bench- 
mark year, intermediate inputs were valued at much lower prices than gross output, so the ratio of 
the value of intermediate inputs to gross output was lower than usual. Table 12.3  Gross Value of Output, Value Added, and Labor Productivity in Manufacturing  in (former) CPEs as a Percentage of West 




Gross Value of  Value Added  Material Inputs as a % 
Value Added  Output per Employee  per Employee  of Gross Outputb 
(2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Czechoslovakia (1989) 
East Germany (1987) 
Hungary (1987) 
Poland (1989) 
West Germany (1987-89) 
East Germany (1992) 
Poland (1993)” 









































Source: Appendix tables 12A.1 and 12A.2. 
Note: The conversion to common currency was done at the geometric average of the unit value ratios at own country weights and (West) German weights. 
‘Poland as a percentage of all Germany. 
bCalculated on the basis of  domestic prices. 
‘After adjustment of gross output UVR to a value-added UVR by  using a UVR for intermediate inputs that was derived by backdating the gross output UVR by six 
months using the producer price index. This adjustment was necessary because of  an inflation rate of  over 700 percent in Poland in 1989. 338  Bart van Ark, Erik Monnikhof, and Marcel Timmer 
There are various explanations for the larger share of material inputs in gross 
output in CPEs compared to market economies. First, there has been a greater 
wastage of intermediate inputs. Although in recent decades value added rather 
than gross output was the major performance criterion in CPEs, there was no 
budget constraint on inputs. This led to an inefficient use of  raw materials, 
energy, and other intermediate inputs. Production prices were raised to allow 
for greater wastage, and product-oriented subsidies were accorded when prices 
became too high. Related to this, a second reason for the larger use of interme- 
diate inputs is the misallocation of inputs across industries owing to the distor- 
tion of prices. Third, firms tended to hold large stocks of materials and semi- 
finished products, which they used to exchange with other firms in order to 
compensate for general shortages. Fourth, there may have been a trade-off be- 
tween the low technology content and high material input content for many 
products from CPE countries. For example, CPEs often invested in heavy and 
solid machine tools that performed relatively simple functions with large mar- 
gins of tolerance. The latter were typical "low-value-added" products, charac- 
terized by relatively low ratios of value added to gross o~tput.'~ 
In our comparisons, we use value added rather than gross output because, at 
the aggregate level of  total manufacturing, the use of  value added prevents 
double-counting. Moreover, by using value added, we take account of at least 
part of the quality problem outlined above, namely, as far as it is related to the 
typical low-value-added content of CPE products. To the extent that the use of 
excessive intermediate inputs per unit of output was meant to compensate for 
the low technology content of the products, an implicit correction is made for 
the low quality content of the products in the CPE country. Admittedly, this 
method is crude and does not provide an exact adjustment for quality. However, 
as the latter type of adjustment is very difficult to come by directly, our value- 
added comparisons are a better proxy for "quality-adjusted'' productivity than 
the gross output comparisons. 
Table 12.3 shows that gross output per employee in manufacturing varied 
from 33 percent of  the West German level in Hungary to 49 percent in East 
Germany during the late 1980s. The value added per person employed as a 
percentage of West Germany varied from 29 percent in Hungary and Poland 
to 32 percent in Czechoslovakia and East Germany. The two comparisons for 
the early 1990s suggest a significant improvement in manufacturing productiv- 
ity in East Germany relative to West Germany but a worsening of the produc- 
tivity performance in Poland versus all Germany. 
The ICOP papers cited in the source notes to table 12.1 and appendix tables 
12A.1 and 12A.2 document the binary comparisons in more detail and provide 
disaggregated productivity results by industry and branch. Table 12.4 summa- 
19. This difference in the nature of  products produced  in former CPEs compared  to high- 
productivity market economies comes out clearly in a study comparing manufacturing plants in 
East and West European countries producing similar products (see Hitchens, Wagner, and Birnie 
1993, chap. 5). Table 12.4  Comparative Levels of Value Added per Employee in Manufacturing, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland as a 
Percentage of West Germany,” 1987-93 
~_____ 
Czechoslovakia,  East Germany,  Hungary,  Poland,  East Germany,  Poland, 
1989  1987  1987  1989  1992  1993a 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Food products, beverages, and tobacco  23.7  46.3  29.3  30.4  44.5  29.6 
Textile products, wearing apparel, leather products, 
and footwear  31.0  41.1  32.9  24.2  43.4  19.2 
Chemicals, rubber and plastic products, and oil 
refining  73.9  44.4  29.6  39.1  33.7  27.5 
Basic and fabricated metal products  35.7  40.1  30.0  21.9  63.7  19.7 
Electrical and nonelectrical machinery and transport 
equipment  28.0  22.4  29.8  34.4  48.1  25.9 
Other manufacturingh  34.2  27.7  26.3  25.6  47.5  17.8 
Total manufacturing  32.3  32.0  28.6  29.3  46.9  23.5 
Source: See table 12.1. For statistical sources, see appendix tables 12A.1 and 12A.2. 
“Poland as a percentage of  all Germany. 
bIncludes wood products and furniture; paper and paper products and printing; nonmetallic minerals and “other manufacturing.” 340  Bart van Ark, Erik Monnikhof, and Marcel Timmer 
rizes these results at the level of  six major branches in manufacturing. The 
estimates suggest a varied pattern across the (former) CPEs. In Czechoslovakia 
and East Germany, the machinery and equipment branch experienced relatively 
low productivity levels compared to West Germany, whereas chemicals scored 
relatively well. In East Germany, basic metals and metal products also showed 
high productivity levels compared to the other CPE countries. In  Poland, 
chemicals and machinery and equipment showed a relatively good productivity 
performance, whereas basic metals and metal products had by far the lowest 
productivity level compared to West Germany. Finally, Hungary showed rela- 
tively little variation in productivity levels by  major branch around the mean 
for total manufacturing. 
12.2  The Gerschenkron Effect and the Role of Distortion 
The literature on the comparative performance of (former) centrally planned 
economies has put much emphasis on distortion of the price formation process 
in these countries. If  prices do not fulfill their role to secure an optimal re- 
source allocation, this may lead to a distorted relation between prices and pro- 
duced quantities. 
A first indication of distortion may be derived from the nonexistence of the 
Gerschenkron effect. In a two-country framework, the Gerschenkron effect im- 
plies that, the more the quantity structures of the two countries differ, the more 
the use of  price weights of  one country will lead to an overstatement of  the 
other country’s output (Gerschenkron 195  1).  This effect occurs because goods 
with a high (low) price in one country relative to the other country are associ- 
ated with relatively small (large) quantities. Similarly, the more the price struc- 
tures of the two countries differ, the more the use of quantity weights of one 
country will lead to an overstatement of  the other country’s prices. In terms of 
unit value ratios, this implies that the Laspeyres UVR (using quantity weights 
of  the base country, i.e., the United States or Germany) is higher than the 
Paasche UVR (using quantity weights of the own country). 
Table  12.5 shows that the Paasche-Laspeyres (PL) ratio is below  one in 
twenty-five of  the twenty-six cases. We  grouped our countries into “high- 
productivity market  economies” (HMEs), “low-productivity market  econo- 
mies” (LMEs), and “(former) centrally planned economies” (CPES).~~  Within 
each group, the countries are ordered according to their level of  labor pro- 
ductivity relative to the United States. On  average, the PL ratio is 0.81 for 
all countries together, 0.87 for the HMEs, 0.65 for the LMEs, and 0.93 for the 
CPEs. 
From a theoretical point of view, the results in table 12.5 are somewhat un- 
20. China was included with the LMEs even though, from a political-economic point of  view, 
it would have been correct to include China with the CPEs. As we will show below, the price and 
quantity characteristics of Chinese manufacturing are much more like those of LMEs than those 
of CPEs. Table 12.5  Paasche and Laspeyres Unit Value Ratios (at product quantity weights) for 26 Binary Comparisons of Ex-Factory Product Unit 
Values in Manufacturing 
Paasche UVR  Laspeyres UVR 
numeraire country  numeraire country 
(own country currency1  (own country currency/ 
Number of  currency at own  currency at numeraire  Paasche-Laspeyres 
Products in  country quantity  country quantity  Ratio 
Sample  weights)  weights)  (~(3) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
High-productivity market economies (HMEs) 
West GermanyAJnited States (1992) 
CanadaRTnited States (1987) 
JapanRTnited States (1987) 
FranceRTnited States (1987) 
West GermanyRTnited States (1987) 
JapanRTnited States (1975) 
SpainRTnited States (1992) 
United KingdomRTnited States (1987) 
AustraliaRTnited States (1987) 
United KingdomRTnited States (1975) 
Arithmetic average HMEs 
(Former)  centrally planned economies (CPES)~ 
East Germanymest Germany (1992) 
CzechoslovakiaNest Germany (1989) 
East GermanyNest Germany (1987) 
Soviet UnionRTnited States (1987) 
Polandmest Germany (1989) 
Hungarymest Germany (1987) 
Poland/Germany (1993) 









































































.93 Table 12.5  (continued) 
Paasche UVR  Laspeyres UVR 
numeraire country  numeraire country 
(own country currency/  (own country currency/ 
Number of  currency at own  currency at numeraire  Paasche-Laspeyres 
Products in  country quantity  country quantity  Ratio 
Sample  weights)  weights)  (2~3) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Low-productivity market economies (LMEs) 
BrazillLTnited States (1975) 
MexicoKJnited States (1975) 
South KoreaKJnited States (1987) 
South Koreamnited States (1975) 
TaiwanKJnited States (1976) 
IndonesiaKJnited States (1987) 
South KoreaKJnited States (1967) 
IndiaKJnited States (1975) 
ChinaKJnited States (1987) 







































Arithmetic average all countries  186  .81 
Sources: See references to benchmark comparisons in table  12.1 and appendix table  12A.1. West GermanyKJnited States (1992) are unpublished estimates from 
ICOPLCRA (January 1996); East GermanyNest Germany (1992) from ICOPLCRA (January 1996); JapanKJnited States (1975) from Pilat (1994); South Korea/ 
United States (1967, 1975) from Pilat (1995); the United KingdomKJnited States (1975) from van Ark (1990); TaiwanKJnited States from Timmer (1996). 
Note: The (number of) UVRs reported in this table are slightly different from those used to convert output by manufacturing branch to a common currency (such as, 
e.g., in sec. 12.2)  as the latter have been reweighted by the output share of sample industries. However, in only two cases, we found very big differences: the PL ratio 
for KoreaKJnited States (1975) was 0.75 after reweighting, and the PL ratio for the Soviet UnionKJnited States was 0.58 after reweighting. 
*Excluding  WRs  for food products that are available only at U.S. quantity weights. 
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Fig. 12.1  Relation between Paasche-Laspeyres  ratios and comparative levels of 
value added per person employed in manufacturing for 26 binary comparisons 
Source: Table 12.5. 
expected, as there is a priori less reason to expect the Gerschenkron effect to 
exist with producer prices than with expenditure prices, which were used in 
earlier studies (see Kravis, Heston, and Summers 1982; Nuxoll 1994). When 
prices rise, producers are expected to substitute  for more expensive rather than 
cheaper products.21  On an ad hoc basis, one may hypothesize that consumer 
substitution effects are stronger than the producer substitution effects and that 
therefore the Gerschenkron effect continues to exist even for the ICOP UVRs. 
This hypothesis is reinforced by  the results for the CPEs, for which the PL 
ratio is even closer to one (and, in one case, exceeds one) than for the HMEs. 
The nonexistence of a Gerschenkron effect for these countries could perhaps 
imply that producer effects dominate the PL ratio and that consumer prefer- 
ences are not reflected in the price setting.22 
The special position of the CPEs is confirmed in figure 12.1, which relates 
the Paasche-Laspeyres ratio to the comparative level of labor productivity of 
each country relative to the United States. Figure 12.1 shows that (former) CPEs 
have a higher PL ratio than their comparative level of productivity would sug- 
gest. 
We  also analyzed the results statistically by regressing the PL ratios on the 
21. For a theoretical exposition of these contrasting effects in neoclassical consumer and pro- 
ducer theories, see, e.g., Usher (1980). 
22. We emphasize, however, that this explanation remains unsatisfactory as both producer and 
consumer theories are essentially static, whereas dynamic theories about substitution are called 
for. We have therefore not pursued this line of investigation further in this paper. 344  Bart van Ark, Erik Monnikhof, and Marcel Timmer 
comparative productivity performance of each country relative to the United 
States (see regression 1 in  appendix table  12A.4). The regression shows a 
highly  significant  coefficient for  the  productivity ratio.  When  a  separate 
dummy variable is introduced for the CPE countries, the results become even 
more significant. 
To analyze the atypical pattern of the Paasche-Laspeyres ratio for the CPE 
countries in more detail, we used the Bortkiewicz formula, which decomposes 
the PL ratio into three independent elements: (1) the weighted coefficient of 
variation of the price relatives between two countries (up);  (2) the weighted 
coefficient of  variation of  the quantity relatives between two countries (a,); 
and (3) the weighted coefficient of correlation (rp4)  between the price and the 
quantity relatives.23  In a formula: 
(1) 
where PxUCu)  and QXu(")  are the Laspeyres price and quantity indexes between 
countries X and U of  all manufacturing goods, respectively, and PxuCx)  and 
QXu(")  are the Paasche price and quantity indexes between countries X and U 
of  all manufacturing goods, respectively. The weighted coefficients of  varia- 
tion, up  and uq,  are defined as 
UP  0, 
PXUCX)  QXu(X)  -  -- 
PXUCU)  -  QXU'U)  - l+  rPupxuoexu(u). 
and the weighted coefficient of correlation (rPJ  as 
m 
cw:(pXU  - pXU(U))(Q:U  - QXU(u)) 
-  ,=I 
(3)  $4  - 
zw:  t=1 
where PrU  is the ratio of the price of good i in country X and country U, QTu 
is the ratio of the quantity of good i in country X and country U, and wp  is the 
value of good i in country U. 
Table 12.6 shows the values of these three components. In the next section, 
we will deal with the variation in price and quantity relatives (cols. 1 and 2). 
Here, we focus on the correlation coefficient (col. 3), which may be used as a 
proxy of the degree of distortion. When the price relatives between country X 
and country U do not show a clear negative relation to the quantity relatives, a 
greater distortion in country X is suggested on the assumption that the numer- 
aire country U (which is either the United States or West Germany) has rela- 
23. For an extensive description and derivation, see Allen (1975,62-65). For an application of 
the Bortkiewicz formula to a time series of  U.S.  machinery output from 1899 to 1939, see Jonas 
and Sardy (1970). See also Dikhanov (1994). Table 12.6  Coefficients of Variation of Price and Quantity Relatives and the Correlation between Prices and Quantities for 26 Binary 
Comparisons in Manufacturing  (aU  at numeraire country weights) 
Coefficient of Variation 
Coefficient 
Price Ratios  Quantity Ratios  of Correlation 
(between own country  (between own country  (between price and 
and numeraire country)  and nurneraire country)  quantity relatives) 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
High-productivity market economies (HMEs) 
West Germanymnited States (1992) 
Canada/United States (1987) 
JapanAJnited States (1987) 
FranceAJnited States (1987) 
West GermanyAJnited States (1987) 
Japanmnited States (1975) 
SpainAJnited States (1992) 
United Kingdornmnited States (1987) 
Australiamnited States (1987) 
United KingdornAJnited States (1975) 
Arithmetic average HMEs 
(Former)  centrally planned economies (CPEs) 
East GermanyNest Germany (1992) 
CzechoslovakiaNest Germany (1989) 





























-  .09 
-  .07 
-.17 




-  .22 
-.12 





(continued) Table 12.6  (continued) 
Coefficient of Variation 
Coefficient 
Price Ratios  Quantity Ratios  of Correlation 
(between own country  (between own country  (between price and 
and numeraire country)  and numeraire country)  quantity relatives) 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Soviet UnionAJnited States (1987) 
Polandmest Germany (1989) 
Hungarymest Germany (1987) 
Poland/Germany (1993) 
Arithmetic average CPEs 
Low-productivity markel economies (LMEs) 
BraziVUnited States (1975) 
Mexicownited States (1975) 
South KoreaAJnited States (1987) 
South KoreaAJnited States (1975) 
Taiwanmnited States (1976) 
Indonesiawnited States (1987) 
South KoreaAJnited States (1967) 
Indiawnited States (1975) 
Chinamnited States (1987) 
Arithmetic average LMEs 

































-  .03 
-.lo 
-.18 




-  .08 
-.12 
-  .04 
-.16 
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tively little or no distortion. Column 3 of table 12.6 shows that the sign of the 
correlation coefficient between price  and  quantity relatives  is  negative in 
twenty-five of the twenty-six cases. However, as the (absolute) mean is lower 
for the CPE countries (-0.10)  than for the HMEs (-0.16)  and the LMEs 
(-0.13),  this may be interpreted as a sign of greater distortion in CPES.~~ 
The relation between price and quantity relatives can also be analyzed by 
looking  at  the  unweighted  coefficient of  correlation  instead  of  a  value- 
weighted one, as in equation (3). For this purpose, we  carried out a simple 
OLS (ordinary least squares) regression over all products in each compari~on:~~ 
(4)  logPy =  a+  PX  lOgQ7. 
Column 1 in table 12.7 shows that a negative relation is found for all coun- 
tries, and column 2 indicates that this relation is significantly different from 
zero for all but two binary comparisons.26  Column 3 shows the sample correla- 
tion coefficient, r. A low (absolute) r indicates that, even when a significant 
relation is found as indicated by the t-statistic, the variability is high; that is, 
the observations are relatively far from their "predicted" value. A low I  can 
therefore be interpreted as a measure of distortion as it suggests a weak relation 
between relative quantities and prices. Table 12.7 therefore confirms the con- 
clusion that we drew from table 12.6, namely, that CPEs clearly show a greater 
distortion of  prices (r = 0.21) than either HMEs (r = 0.34) or LMEs (r = 
0.41). Again, for all but two countries, I is significantly different from zero. A 
two-tailed test rejects the hypothesis of equal price distortion of the CPEs vis- 
8-vis the HMEs and LMEs at the 99 percent significance level (with a t-value 
of 2.99). 
As our ultimate interest is in the relative productivity performance of these 
countries, we  can compare the correlation coefficient, r, to the comparative 
productivity performance of  each country relative to the United States. The 
results are plotted in figure 12.2, which shows that no relation can be found 
between the degree of  distortion, as measured here, and the manufacturing 
value added per person employed relative to the United States. 
Finally, it is noted  alongside that, for all three groups of  countries, the 
sample coefficient of  correlation, r, is rather low, which suggests that, apart 
from the negative effect of quantity relatives on price relatives, other factors 
determine the value of the UVRs as well. 
24. Czechoslovakia is a strong outlier in the opposite direction, which is caused by the relatively 
small number of matched items in the sample (see table 12.5). 
25. Several functional forms were experimented with, of which the present double log form 
gave the best fit. 
26. Lack of significance was found for the PolandGermany comparison for 1993 and for the 
Canaddnited States comparison for 1987. The latter effect is caused by  the fact that the range 
of values for the UVRs and quality indexes hardly differs from the mean. When using OLS regres- 
sion, the influence of  measurement errors is greatly magnified when the values of the variables are 
within very small ranges. 348  Bart van Ark, Erik Monnikhof, and Marcel Timmer 
Table 12.7  Results of Unweighted Regression of Log Price Ratios on Log 
Quantity Ratios for 26 Binary Comparisons in Manufacturing 
Coefficient of 
Log of Quantity  Coefficient of 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Relatives (log QI)  t-Statistic  Correlation 
High-productivity market economies (HMEs) 
West GermanylUnited States (1992) 
CanadalUnited States (1987) 
JapanKJnited States (1987) 
FrancelUnited States (1987) 
West GermanylUnited States (1987) 
JapanlCTnited States (1975) 
SpainlUnited States (1992) 
United KingdomlUnited States (1987) 
AustraliaNnited States (1987) 
United KingdomAJnited States (1975) 
Arithmetic average HMEs 
(Former)  centrally planned economies (CPEs) 
East GermanyNest Germany (1992) 
Czechoslovakia/West Germany (1989) 
East Germany/West Germany (1987) 
Soviet UnionAJnited States (1987) 
Polandmest Germany (1989) 
HungaryNest Germany (1987) 
Poland/Germany (1993) 
Arithmetic average CPEs 
Low-productivity market economies (LMEs) 
BrazillIInited States (1975) 
MexicolUnited States (1975) 
South KoreaAJnited States (1987) 
South KoreaKJnited States (1975) 
TaiwanlUnited States (1976) 
IndonesiaKJnited States (1987) 
South KoreaAJnited States (1967) 
IndiaKJnited States (1975) 
ChinalUnited States (1987) 
Arithmetic average LMEs 
Arithmetic average all countries 
-.11  -6.5 
-.01  -  .7 
-.15  -6.9 
-  .20  -5.0 
-  .07  -4.4 
-.16  -7.1 
-.15  -7.1 
-.13  -4.5 
-.14  -5.9 
-  .08  -2.2 
-.12  -5.0 
-  .09  -3.8 
-.09  -2.3 
-  .09  -3.4 
-.16  -1.6 
-  .06  -2.0 
-  .07  -5.0 
-.01  -  .7 
-  .08  -3.1 
-.I6  -5.9 
-.05  -2.2 
-.18  -  10.0 
-.14  -6.0 
-.I3  -5.1 
-.lo  -4.4 
-.18  -7.4 
-.11  -3.9 
-.14  -2.5 
-.13  -5.3 
-.11  -4.6 
-.31 
-.05 
-  .45 
-.54 
-.26 
-  .49 
-  .42 
-.33 
-.41 
-  .20 
-.34 
-  .23 




-  .25 
-  .06 
-.21 
-  .46 
-.19 
-  .60 
-  .43 
-  .45 
-.30 





Sources: See tables 12.1 and 12.5 and appendix table 12A.1. 
12.3  The Role of Relative Quantity and Price Structures 
The existence of a distortion between price and quantity relatives does not 
tell us anything about differences between countries in terms of their structure 
of prices and/or their structure of quantities. In the previous section, the Bort- 
kiewicz formula showed that these factors also affect the Paasche-Laspeyres 
ratio of our price and quantity relatives. For this, we need to look in more detail 349  Prices, Quantities, and Productivity in Industry 
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Fig. 12.2  Relation between coefficients of correlation of price and quantity 
relatives and comparative levels of value added per person employed in 
manufacturing  for 26 binary comparisons 
Source: Table 12.7. 
at the other two terms on the right-hand side of  equation (l), the weighted 
coefficients of variation of the price and quantity relatives, which are given in 
equation (2). Column 1 in table 12.6 shows that the coefficient of variation of 
the price index (a,) is 0.50 for all countries together, 0.43 for HMEs, 0.58 for 
the LMEs, and 0.48 for the CPE countries. The coefficient of variation of the 
quantity index (uq)  is 3.38 for all countries, 1.96 for the HMEs, and 6.08 for 
the LMEs (table 12.6, col. 2).27  For the CPEs, the average coefficient of varia- 
tion for the quantity index is virtually equal to that of the HMEs, namely, 1.94. 
The results suggest that price structures are more similar across countries 
than quantity structures. The LMEs have a higher price and quantity dispersion 
compared to their numeraire country than do the HMEs. The price dispersion 
of  the CPEs fits nicely between that of  the HMEs and LMEs. However, the 
quantity dispersion of CPEs is clearly closer to that of the HMEs than to that 
of the LMEs. 
A second way  of  measuring the spread of  price relatives and of  quantity 
relatives is to calculate the standard deviations of the price indexes, P:u(u), and 
the quantity indexes, QY(").  This method was  also suggested by  Allen and 
Diewert (1981). In contrast to the variables in the Bortkiewicz formula, price 
and quantity relatives are not weighted by  their relative value shares (see eq. 
27. Taiwan is a strong outlier, which increases uq  for the LMEs. This is caused by the fact that 
the sample is dominated by  the product entry for rubber and plastic shoes. However, even after 
excluding Taiwan, the coefficient of variation for the LMEs is still as high as 4.5. 350  Bart van Ark, Erik Monnikhof, and Marcel Timmer 
[2]). In fact, for the purpose of studying dispersion, we see no a priori reason 
to give a bigger weight to goods with higher value shares than to goods that 
are less important.28 
The results on the dispersion of  price and quantity relatives in table  12.8 
largely correspond with those presented in table 12.6. There is a much lower 
dispersion of  the UVRs (col. 1) than of  the quantity relatives (col. 2), and 
the dispersion of  the quantity relatives for the CPEs is very close to that for 
the HMEs. 
Figures 12.3 and 12.4 suggest a significant relation between both price and 
quantity dispersion and the comparative level of  labor productivity, respec- 
tively. However, figure 12.4 shows that the CPEs are clear outliers: given their 
relative productivity level, the CPEs’ quantity dispersion is much closer to that 
of the HMEs than to that of the LMEs. The latter observation is confirmed by 
the results of regression 2 (appendix table 12A.4), which shows that the coef- 
ficient on the CPE dummy is highly significant. 
A third way of comparing price and quantity structures is by calculating so- 
called similarity indexes. The basic idea behind similarity indexes is to con- 
struct for each country a price (or quantity) vector constituted of the prices (or 
quantities) of all m items in the sample. For each country, the prices (or quanti- 
ties) of all items are related and represented by one single vector. For the case of 
two countries, A and B, and two goods, 1 and 2, figure 12.5 may be illustrative. 
In case of a price comparison, the x-  and y-axes show the prices of good 1 
and good 2, respectively. The angle a  between the two price vectors can be 
seen as a measure of the similarity between the two vectors. The similarity 
index, which is defined as the cosine of the angle, varies between zero and one 
and is lower in case of greater dissimilarity. Using the definition of the cosine 
of an angle of two vectors in an m-dimensional space, and introducing quantity 
weights for each observation in the sample in order to make the indexes “unit 
invariant,” the following price similarity indexes can be derived: 
(5) 
28. We use the logarithm of the relatives as only in the log form do ratios smaller than one have 
a symmetrical influence on the total as ratios bigger than one. This makes the measures more 
suitable for constructing similarity indexes than the untransformed relatives used in the Bortkie- 
wicz formula. Note that the logs of the price and quantity relatives have been normalized by their 
unweighted mean. Table 12.8  Dispersion of Normalized Log Unit Value Ratios and Log Quantity 
Ratios for 26 Binary Comparisons  in Manufacturing 
Standard Deviations 
Log of  Unit Value 
Ratio (log UVR) 
Log of  Quantity 
Relative (log QI) 
(1)  (2) 
High-productivity market economies (HMEs) 
West GermanylLTnited States (1992) 
Canadamnited States (1987) 
Japanmnited States (1987) 
Francemnited States (1987) 
West GermanylLTnited States (1987) 
Japanmnited States (1975) 
Spainmnited States (1992) 
United Kingdommnited States (1987) 
Australiamnited States (1987) 
United KingdomiUnited States (1975) 
Arithmetic average HMEs 
(Former)  centrally planned economies (CPEs) 
East GermanyNest Germany (1992) 
CzechoslovakiaNest Germany (1989) 
East Germanymest  Germany (1987) 
Soviet Unionmnited States (1987) 
PolandlWest Germany (1989) 
HungarylWest Germany (1987) 
Poland/Germany (1993) 
Arithmetic average CPEs 
Low-productivity market economies (LMEs) 
BraziVUnited States (1975) 
MexicoRTnited States (1975) 
South Koreamnited States (1987) 
South KorealLTnited States (1975) 
Taiwanmnited States (1976) 
IndonesialLTnited States (1987) 
South Koreamnited States (1967) 
IndialLTnited States (1975) 
ChinaiUnited States (1987) 
Arithmetic average LMEs 
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Fig. 12.3  Relation between relative price dispersion and comparative levels of 
value added per person employed in manufacturing for 26 binary comparisons 
Source: Table 12.8. 
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of value added per person employed in manufacturing for 26 binary 
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Good 1 
Fig. 12.5  Illustration of a comparison of two price (or quantity) vectors 
where SPxu(uj  is the price similarity index between countries X and U, using 
quantities of  country U as weights, and SPxu(x)  is the price similarity index 
between countries X and U, using quantities of country X as weights. In the 
same way, price weights are applied in the quantity similarity indexes: 
where SQxu(u)  is the quantity similarity index between countries X and U, us- 
ing prices of country U as weights, and SPxu(xj  is the quantity similarity index 
between countries X and U, using prices of country X as weights. These simi- 
larity measures are also used in ICP reports-although  in a different form- 
including Kravis, Heston, and  Summers (1982) and Heston  and Summers 
(1993). An important feature of our indexes is that these have natural weights 
attached to them, that is, quantity weights for the price similarity index and 
price weights for the quantity similarity index. 
Table 12.9 shows the Fisher quantity and price similarity indexes for our 
sample of twenty-six binary  comparison^.^^ As was observed above, it is clear 
that the price similarity indexes are much closer to each other than are the 
quantity indexes, again suggesting that price structures are more similar across 
countries than are quantity structures. However, in contrast to the results pre- 
sented earlier, the HMEs show much greater quantity similarity relative to their 
base country than the CPEs (col. 2, table 12.9). The quantity structure of the 
LMEs is most dissimilar from that of the HMEs. This outcome is more in line 
with the natural dichotomy between low- and high-productivity economies. 
29. The Fisher index is the geometric average of the Paasche and Laspeyres indexes presented 
in eqq. (4)  and (5).  For the Paasche and Laspeyres similarity indexes, see appendix table 12A.3. Table 12.9  Price and Quantity Similarity Indexes for 26 Binary Comparisons 
in Manufacturing 
Quantity 
Price  Quantity  Similarity 
Index  Index  (excluding cars) 
Similarity  Similarity  Index 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
High-productivity mrket economies (HMEs) 
West GermanyAJnited States (1992) 
CanadaAJnited States (1987) 
Japanmnited States (1987) 
FranceKJnited States (1987) 
West GermanyAJnited States (1987) 
JapanKJnited States (1975) 
SpainAJnited States (1992) 
United KingdomKJnited States (1987) 
AustraliaKJnited States (1987) 
United KingdomKJnited States (1975) 
Arithmetic average HMEs 
(Former)  centrally planned economies (CPEs) 
East GermanylWest Germany (1992) 
CzechoslovakialWest Germany (1989) 
East GerrnanylWest Germany (1987) 
Soviet UnionAJnited States (1987) 
PolandNest Germany (1989) 
HungarylWest Germany (1987) 
Poland/Germany (1993) 
Arithmetic average CPEs 
Low-productivity market economies (LMEs) 
BraziWnited States (1975) 
MexicoAJnited States (1975) 
South KoreaKJnited States (1987) 
South KoreaAJnited States (1975) 
TaiwanAJnited States (1976) 
IndonesialCTnited States (1987) 
South KoreaKJnited States (1967) 
Indiamnited States (1975) 
ChinaKJnited States (1987) 
Arithmetic average LMEs 



























































































Source: See tables 12.1 and 12.5 and appendix table 12A.1. 
Note: The similarity indexes are geometric (Fisher) averages of the indexes at own country weights 
and numeraire country weights (see appendix table 12A.3). Column 3 is as col. 2, but the product 
matches for cars have been taken out of the product sample. 355  Prices, Quantities, and  Productivity in Industry 
Regression 5 in appendix table 12A.4 shows a fairly strong positive relation 
between the quantity similarity indexes and the comparative productivity ratios 
but no significant coefficient for the CPE dummy. 
One possible explanation for the difference in results between the quantity 
similarity indexes from table 12.9 and the dispersion of the quantity relatives 
in table 12.8 might be related to the effect of the product match for cars. In our 
product sample for the centrally planned economies, cars accounted for more 
than  15 percent of  the product sample, with the exception of  Hungary. As 
discussed in section 12.1,  the product match for cars in CPEs is relatively sensi- 
tive to the problem of quality differences. It appears that, after deleting cars 
from the product sample, the average quantity similarity index for the CPEs goes 
up very substantially and is again very close to that for the HMEs (table 12.9, 
col. 3). 
12.4  Conclusions 
Manufacturing productivity levels in (former) centrally planned economies 
back to 1950 have been substantially lower than in high-productivity market 
economies and were on average in between labor productivity levels of Asian 
(except Korea) and Latin American low-productivity economies. After their 
recent transition to a market economy, most Eastern European countries expe- 
rienced a collapse in productivity which has been followed by  a recovery in 
which they have attained or even surpassed pretransition levels. 
This paper showed that the difference between the Paasche and the Las- 
peyres measures of industry purchasing power parities was relatively small for 
the CPEs given their relative level of labor productivity, suggesting the absence 
of a typical Gerschenkron effect. One possible explanation for this small gap 
might be that producer substitution effects in CPEs dominated consumer sub- 
stitution effects. The Gerschenkron effect theoretically exists only in the latter 
case. Alternatively, the high Paasche-Laspeyres (PL) ratio may be the result of 
a distortion between relative price and quantity indexes. The pricing system in 
CPEs was traditionally based on a cost-plus-taxes-plus-markup system, with 
net indirect taxes being used to reallocate resources according to socially desir- 
able goals. 
We decomposed the PL ratio into the effects of dispersion (or dissimilarity) 
of  price and quantity relatives and the effect of  the relation between price 
and quantity relatives. We  found that CPEs were characterized by  (1) a rela- 
tively weak (negative) relation between price and quantity indexes, indicating 
distortion, and  (2)  a relatively  similar structure of  quantities compared to 
high-productivity market economies. Even though we did not find a relation 
between our measure of distortion and the comparative level of labor produc- 
tivity, it is not unlikely that the greater price distortion in CPEs led to a misallo- 
cation of resources, which in turn might explain the atypical quantity structure 
that was observed. 356  Bart van Ark, Erik Monnikhof, and Marcel Timmer 
Table 12.10  Average Shares by Major Branch in Total Employment in High- 
Productivity Market Economies, Low-Productivity Market 
Economies and (former) Centrally Planned Economies 
Share of Employment 
HMEs“  CPEsb  LMEs‘ 
Food products, beverages, and tobacco  9.8  12.3  22.9 
Textile products, wearing apparel, leather 
products, and footwear  10.4  15.0  19.6 
Chemicals,  rubber and plastic products, and 
oil refining  11.7  10.0  12.6 
Basic and fabricated metal products  12.1  11.5  10.2 
Electrical and nonelectrical  machinery and 
transport equipment  35.7  34.5  15.4 
Other manufacturingd  20.3  16.8  19.2 
Total manufacturing  100.0  100.0  100.0 
~~~~  ~  ~~  ~~ 
Sources: See table 12.1. 
‘High-productivity market economies: arithmetic average for France (1987). Germany (1987), Ja- 
pan (1987), the United Kingdom (1987), and the United States (1987). 
b(Former)  centrally planned economies: arithmetic average for Czechoslovakia (1989). East Ger- 
many (1987, 1992),  Hungary (1987), and Poland (1989, 1993). 
‘Low-productivity market economies: arithmetic average for Brazil (1975), India (1975), Indone- 
sia (1987), and Mexico (1975). 
dIncludes  wood products and furniture, paper and paper products and printing, nonmetallic  min- 
eral and “other manufacturing.” 
Given the lower productivity performance of CPEs, how should the quantity 
similarity between CPEs and high-productivity market economies be inter- 
preted? One possible explanation is that the industrialization strategies of the 
CPEs were successful insofar as they stimulated the production of capital in- 
tensive production of, in particular, investment goods. This led to a conver- 
gence of their quantity structures to that of high-productivity market econo- 
mies. Production plans  and pricing policies of  CPEs were  geared toward 
boosting the production of capital intensive goods. 
A first indication for that explanation can be obtained from table 12.10, 
which compares the average employment structure of the manufacturing sector 
between CPEs with that of  some low-productivity market economies (Bra- 
zil, India, Indonesia, and Mexico) and some high-productivity market econo- 
mies (France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States). 
The table clearly shows that the employment structure (which serves here as a 
proxy for resource allocation) of  the CPEs was much closer to that of  the 
HMEs than to that of the LMEs. It is particularly striking that the share of 
employment in electrical and nonelectrical machinery and transport equipment 
was almost as high in CPEs as in HMEs. As was noted above, the comparative 
levels of  productivity in this major branch were relatively low in CPEs, in 
particular, in Czechoslovakia and East Germany. It suggests that the CPEs 
failed in transforming their atypical pattern of industrialization into a success- 357  Prices, Quantities, and Productivity in Industry 
ful long-term growth strategy. It led to a typical pattern of “extensive” growth 
in CPEs, which ground to a halt once no more potential resources remained 
idle (van Ark 1996). 
Finally, although the CPEs show a price structure that is not too dissimilar 
from that of the non-CPEs, CPEs lacked incentives for a systematic improve- 
ment of product quality. In fact, pricing policies stimulated price increases of 
so-called new products without observable improvements in product quality. 
A more full-scale adjustment of the ICOP estimates for lower product quality 
in  the  CPEs might imply lower  “real”  quantities of,  in  particular,  invest- 
ment goods and durable consumer goods. This might therefore increase the 
quantity dissimilarity between (former) centrally planned economies and high- 
productivity market economies beyond what has been observed in this paper. 
Appendix 
Table 12A.1  Number of Unit Value Ratios and Coverage Percentages of Matched 
Output in Manufacturing 
Matched Output as a 
% of Gross Output 
Number of 
Unit Value  Own  West 
Ratios  Country  Germany 
CzechoslovakiaNest Germany (1989)  69  32.0  23.2 
Hungarymest Germany (1987)  383  33.1  19.3 
PolandNest Germany (1989)  236  33.6  19.4 
East GermanyNest Germany (1992)  255  28.0  20.4 
Poland/All Germany (1993)  305  57.8  32.3 
East GermanyNest Germany (1987)  335  41.1  33.7 
Sources: Czechoslovakia/West Germany (1989) from van Ark and Beintema (1993), adjusted in 
van Ark (1996); data on product detail for Czechoslovakia (1989) derived from Federal Statistical 
Office, Monthly Inquiry  on Production and Sales of Selected Industrial Products, and Annual Sur- 
vey of Industrial Enterprises. East Germanymest Germany (1987) from Beintema and van Ark 
(1994), adjusted in van Ark (1995a); original information on product detail for East Germany 
(1987) from Staatliche Zentralverwaltung fuer Statistik, Abrechnung der Erzeugnispositionen der 
Erzeugnis- und Leistungsnomenklatur: Jahreserhebung I987 (Berlin). Hungarymest Germany 
(1987) from Monnikhof (1996); original information on product detail for Hungary from Kozponti 
Statisztikai Hivatal, Statisztikai Evkonyv, I987 (Budapest, 1989), supplemented with unpublished 
data provided by  the Hungarian Central Statistical Office. Polandmest Germany (1989) from 
Liberia, Monnikhof, and van Ark (1996); original information on product detail for Poland from 
Glowny Urzad Statystyczny, Produkcja wyrobow Przemyslowych w I989 R (Warsaw, 1991). East 
Germanymest Germany (1992) are unpublished ICOPLCRA estimates (January 1996); original 
information on product detail for both parts of Germany from Statistisches Bundesamt, Produktion 
im Produzierenden Gewerbe (Wiesbaden,  1992). Polandlall  Germany (1993) are unpublished 
ICOPLCRA estimates (January 1996); original information on product detail for Poland from 
Glowny Urzad Statystyczny, Produkcja wyrobow przemyslowych w 1993  R (Warsaw, 1995). Origi- 
nal information on product detail for West Germany from Statistisches Bundesamt, Produktion im 
Produzierenden Gewerbe (Wiesbaden, 1987, 1989,1992, and 1993). Table 12A.2  Gross Value of Industrial Output, Value Added, Number of Employees: Centrally Planned Economies and Germany, 1987-93 
Own Country  (West) Germany 
Gross Value 
of Output  Value Added  Intermediate  Intermediate 
(million  (million  Inputs as %  Number of  Gross Value  Inputs as %  Number of 
national  national  of Gross  Employees  of Output  Value Added  of Gross  Employees 
currency)  currency)  Output  (thousands)  (million DM)  (million DM)  Output  (thousands) 
CzechoslovakialWest Germany (1989)  833,285  290,940  65.1  2,326.6  1,469,432  710,484  51.6  7,105.9 
Fast Germany/West Germany (1987)  467,4  18  160,017  65.8  2.763.6  1,260,359  655,041  48.0  6,855.5 
HungarylWest Germany (1987)  1,230,699  498,909  59.5  1,284.4  1,421,796  683,593  51.9  6,772.7 
PolandWest Germany (1989)  91,850  53,329  41.9  3,170.1  1,625,414  798,334  50.9  6,856.7 
East GermanylWest Germany (1992)  82,140  31,930  61.1  741.2  1,870,273  881,006  52.9  7,224.7 
PolandlAIl Germany (1993)"  878,168  359,140  59.1  2,340.3  1,841,698  864,740  53.0  7,202.4 
Sources: CzechoslovakialWest Germany (1989) from van Ark and Beintema (1993).  adjusted in van Ark (1996);  data on output and employment for Czechoslovakia derived from Federal 
Statistical Office, Annual Survey  oflndustrial Enterprisesfor 2989. East Germany/West Germany (1987) from Beintema and van Ark (1994), adjusted in van Ark (1995a); original information 
on output and employment for East Germany from Gemeinsames Statistisches Amt, Ergebnisse  der Erfassung der Arbeitssraeten der Betriebe des Wirtschajibereiches Industrie  (Berlin, 
1990). Ratio of value added to output from Staatliches Zentralverwaltung fuer Statistik,  Verjlechungsbilanz des Gesellschajilichen Gesarntproduktes, 2987 (Berlin,  1988). HungarylWest 
Germany (1987) from Monnikhof (1996); original information on output and employment for Hungary from Kozponti Statisztikai Hivatal, Statisztikai Evkonyv, 1987 (Budapest, 1989), and 
Iparstatistikai Evkonyv, 2987 (Budapest, 1989). East Germany/West Germany are unpublished ICOPLCRA estimates (January 1996); original information on output and employment for 
both parts of Germany from Statistisches Bundesamt, Kostenstrukfurder Unternehrnen, 2992 (Wieshaden, 1994). Poland/all Germany (1993) are unpublished ICOPLCRA estimates (January 
1996); original information on output and employment for Poland from GIowny Urzad Statystyczny, Rocznik Statystyczny Przemyslu,  2993 (Warsaw, 1995). Original information on output 
and employment for West Germany from Statistisches Bundesamt, Kostenstruktur der Unternehmen (Wiesbaden, 1987,  1989, 1992, and 1993). 
'Polish values in billion zlotys. Table 12A.3  Price and Quantity Similarity Indexes for 26 Binary Comparisons 
in Manufacturing 
Price Similarity Index  Quantity Similarity Index 
At Quantity  At Quantity  At Price  At Price 
Weights of  Weights of  Weights of  Weights of 
Numeraire  Own  Numeraire  Own 
Country  Country  Country  Country 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
High-productivity market economies (HMEs) 
West GermanyNnited States (1992)  96  94  60  58 
CanadaAJnited States (1987)  99  99  81  79 
JapanAJnited States (1987)  80  95  80  54 
FrancelLTnited States (1987)  99  100  99  97 
West GermanylLTnited States (1987)  99  100  81  80 
JapanAJnited States (1975)  83  90  79  58 
SpainAJnited States (1992)  92  83  50  58 
United KingdomlLTnited States (1987)  95  93  93  91 
AustraliaAJnited States (1987)  98  96  82  82 
United KingdomRTnited States (1975)  92  91  89  79 
Arithmetic average HMEs  93  94  79  74 
East Germanymest Germany (1992)  99  93  46  45 
Czechoslovakia/West Germany (1989)  99  97  40  39 
Poland/West Germany (1989)  96  90  43  47 
Arithmetic average CPEs  95  89  53  53 
(Former)  centrally planned economies (CPEs) 
East GermanylWest Germany (1987)  98  89  40  41 
Soviet UnionAJnited States (1987)  88  83  61  63 
Hungaqmest Germany (1987)  95  84  61  68 
Poland/Germany (1993)  88  90  80  66 
Low-productivity market economies (LMEs) 
BraziVUnited States (1975)  89  93  59  58 
MexicolLTnited States (1975)  96  95  84  87 
South KoreaAJnited States (1987)  85  92  61  40 
South KoreaAJnited States (1975)  83  67  18  27 
TaiwanlLTnited States (1976)  89  90  36  41 
IndonesialLTnited States (1987)  96  95  36  43 
South KoreaAJnited States (1967)  95  83  26  38 
Indialunited States (1975)  87  94  28  23 
China/United States (1987)  93  78  34  21 
Arithmetic average LMEs  90  87  43  42 
Arithmetic average all countries  93  90  60  57 
Source: See tables 12.1 and 12.5 and appendix table 12A.1. 
Note: The geometric (Fisher) averages of  the similarity indexes at own country weights and numeraire 
country weights are presented in table 12.9. 360  Bart van Ark, Erik Monnikhof, and Marcel Timmer 
Table 12A.4  Results of OLS Regressions on Level of Value Added per Person 
Employed with and without Dummy for Centrally Planned Economies 
CPE 
Constant  PROD  Dummy  RZ 
1. Paasche-Laspeyres ratio 
la 
lb 
2. Standard deviation of  QIs 
2a 
2b 
3. Standard deviation of UVRs 
3a 
3b 
4. Price similario index 
4a 
4b 
5. Quantity similarity index (all products) 
5a 
5b 



















-  .0049 
-4.03 
-  ,0063 
-6.06 
-.0019 







































Note: The first line for each regression gives parameter estimates, the second line the correspond- 
ing t-values. The number of  observations for all regressions was 26. PROD = comparative level 
of value added per person employed (United States = 100). CPE dummy = dummy variable: one 
if centrally planned economy, zero otherwise. 
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COIWllent  Irwin L. Collier Jr. 
The gap between a Laspeyres and a Paasche index is something like the Chi- 
nese character for crisis with its double meaning of  “danger” and “opportu- 
nity.” The original “index number problem” came from the discovery that the 
choice of  weights mattered for the numerical value of  a price index, that is, 
that going from here to there typically results in a different answer than coming 
from there to here. The positive sign of the difference between the Laspeyres 
and the Paasche price indexes was soon recognized as an empirical regularity, 
and it was a Berlin professor of economics and statistics, the great Ladislaus 
von Bortkiewicz, who provided an elegant proof that the inverse correlation of 
price and quantity relatives lies at the heart of the matter. Van Ark, Monnikhof, 
and Timmer attempt to exploit the Paasche-Laspeyres ratio in their paper as 
an indicator of price distortion in the former centrally planned economies, and 
to this end they harness Bortkiewicz’s formula. Thus, what began as an empiri- 
cal puzzle appears to have evolved into an opportunity for analysis. With great 
respect for both the careful and the extensive empirical work that stands behind 
this paper, I nevertheless sense that a certain danger may still be lurking within 
the Paasche-Laspeyres ratios calculated by van Ark, Monnikhof, and Timmer 
for the former centrally planned economies. I use my opportunity to comment 
in order to add a note of caution to the empirical tale told by the authors. 
Their tale is fairly straightforward. An important reason they  see for the 
relatively poor productivity performance of the former centrally planned econ- 
omies was a distorted relation between prices and quantities. For a summary 
measure of  this distortion, the authors point to the peculiarly high Paasche- 
Laspeyres ratios that they have calculated for the unit value ratios (UVRs) in 
binary comparisons of  the centrally planned economies with a market econ- 
omy.’ Controlling for differences in productivity levels, the centrally planned 
economies can be seen to differ from market economies, where the benchmark 
is taken to be the average Paasche-Laspeyres ratio in binary comparisons be- 
tween market economies. The Bortkiewicz decomposition of such ratios leads 
the authors to consider the correlation between the price and the quantity rela- 
tives along with the relative dispersion of  quantity relatives and the relative 
dispersion of price relatives.* The moral of this tale is found in the relatively 
Irwin L. Collier Jr. is professor of economics at the Freie Universitat Berlin. 
1. For all but one comparison between the Soviet Union and the United States, the binary com- 
parisons of centrally planned economies were exclusively with West Germany. 
2. The intuition behind the last two terms is that “the index number problem” goes away (more 
precisely, the Paasche-Laspeyres ratio is unity) when either all prices or all quantities differ by  a 
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low correlation found between price and quantity relatives in the binary com- 
parisons of  centrally planned economies with  market  economies. Another 
empirical abnormality reported by  van Ark, Monnikhof, and Timmer is that 
the centrally planned economies had quantity structures that resembled the 
“high-productivity market economies” rather than the “low-productivity mar- 
ket economies.” A pretty good story all told, but can the Paasche-Laspeyres 
ratios calculated from UVRs in bilateral comparisons involving a centrally 
planned economy carry this interpretive load safely? 
Earlier generations of comparative economists, in particular those who cut 
their teeth on Abram Bergson’s The Real National Income of Soviet Russia 
since 1928 (1961), were raised to shun the official valuations coming from the 
centrally planned economies. It was regarded unwholesome to rely on relative 
prices that could be presumed to approximate neither the slopes of production 
possibilities frontiers nor the slopes of  private or social indifference  curve^.^ 
Recognizing the problem of using a market economy’s prices to value a cen- 
trally planned  economy’s quantities:  the solution was sought in estimating 
weights thought to better approximate relative factor costs rather than in a sym- 
metrical treatment of prices across economic systems. For the goal of compar- 
ing outputs and inputs, this was a reasonable strategy. 
This is not to say that van Ark, Monnikhof, and Timmer can be accused of 
simply rushing in where Bergson feared to tread. There is a genuine innovation 
in the use of the Paasche-Laspeyres ratio to serve as a summary indicator of 
overall price distortion, quite a different question from that of  relative eco- 
nomic performance. But pointing us in this direction does not really get us 
very far in terms of economic content. What does it ultimately mean if the gap 
between the Paasche-Laspeyres indexes is half  or double what it would be 
between two market economies? To make matters murkier, we have the prob- 
lem common to all summary indicators-many  other things are confounded 
in the final number, such as measurement error (e.g., the relative quality issue) 
and specification error (e.g., the different function of prices under different 
economic systems). The signal heard by van Ark, Monnikhof, and Timmer may 
be loud; it is hardly clear. 
There is also a fundamental inconsistency with interpreting the Paasche- 
Laspeyres ratios as an indicator of price distortion and then turning around to 
use estimates of relative productivity, apparently based at least in part on these 
problematic UVRs, to analyze the Paasche-Laspeyres (PL) ratios. One can ex- 
pect that there would be an errors-in-variables bias for any simple regression 
analysis of the PL ratio using International Comparisons of Output and Produc- 
3. The late Evsey Domar compared using published economic statistics of the Soviet Union 
with ordering from the menu in a restaurant he did not trust. Domar would always order steak 
rather than goulash, fearing the aggregation that took place in the kitchen. Thus, whenever pos- 
sible, Domar preferred to work with quantity data from the Soviet Union rather than with expendi- 
ture totals. 
4.  For example, an easy way to make the Soviet military threat look particularly menacing was 
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tivity (ICOP) estimates of CPE (centrally planned economy) relative produc- 
tivity as an explanatory variable (see their appendix table 12A.4).5  To  add to 
the statistical confusion, the binary comparisons for all the market countries 
involve the United States, whereas the former centrally planned economies 
have been compared with the old Federal Republic of Gennany.'j  This last prob- 
lem need not necessarily affect the substantive conclusions of the paper; it is 
the sort of detail that does not help tighten confidence intervals either. 
For comparisons in which we are completely free to determine a sampling 
strategy, it should make no difference whether we sample price comparisons 
or quantity comparisons for deflating expenditure totals. However, the ICOP 
quantity relatives had to be painstakingly culled from side-by-side compari- 
sons of national industrial statistics and hardly constitute a random sample of 
quantity relatives. I presume that what ICOP got is what we see. One would 
feel just as uncomfortable were International Comparison Program (ICP) price 
relatives limited to comparisons of mail-order catalogs across countries. While 
the problem of  nonrandom sampling of  quantity relatives is common to all 
ICOP comparisons, I fear that the results are especially vulnerable for compar- 
isons between the high-productivity market economies and the former cen- 
trally planned economies. The sensitivity of  the quantity similarity indexes 
calculated in this paper to the single quality adjustment for automobiles should 
serve as a clear warning against building too high on such a weak foundation. 
My final reservation has to do with the premise of the paper that there was 
a significant causal link running from the price structure of the former centrally 
planned economies to economic performance. Given that fundamental deci- 
sions in the centrally planned economies involving resource allocation were 
coordinated through a system of material balances, it is not obvious why price 
distortion in such economies should have played a very important role for pro- 
ductive efficiency.' Could this be an instance where the symmetrical treatment 
of different economic institutions is worse than leaving an unwanted Gerschenk- 
ron effect from valuing CPE quantities at market prices uncorrected? 
With these few words of caution now added to the record, the authors surely 
deserve a final salute for their innovative use of the Laspeyres-Paasche ratio 
and its Bortkiewicz decomposition. This particular expedition by members of 
the ICOP team reflects the sort of  daring that is sadly missing in so much 
of empirical economics. The glory of discovery goes only to those who accept 
the rigors of the voyage of discovery. Anyone who has attempted such an em- 
5. The authors explicitly acknowledge that they are ignoring the distorting effect that adminis- 
trative prices may have on the weighting system, which may affect the interpretation of the aggre- 
gate results. The authors then refer to the  1985 Marer World Bank project report on dollar esti- 
mates of GNPs in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. If anything, Marer and his team of country 
specialists warned that one should not ignore such distortions. Ignorance may be bliss, but not 
many of  the older hands in the comparative business would have ignored the aggregation dis- 
tortion. 
6. With the single United States/Soviet Union exception noted in n. 1 above. 
7. In contrast, in a market system where the information and incentive functions of the price 
system are critical for the workings of the system, the link is fairly clear and obvious. 367  Prices, Quantities, and Productivity in Industry 
pirical voyage will join in wishing van Ark, Monnikhof, and Timmer godspeed 
in future explorations. 
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